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INTOXICATION AND REMOVAL FROM THE
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT: OHIO'S NO-
FAULT EXCEPTION IN PHELPS V.
POSITIVE ACTION TOOL CO.
Increased alcohol and drug abuse have caused businesses to
incur the high costs of compensating workers who are injured while
intoxicated on the job. Many states have solved the problem by
adopting a statutory intoxication defense. The author illustrates
the danger associated with the continued reliance upon the old
common law abandonment defense which permits courts to intro-
duce fault into the no-fault workers' compensation system.
INTRODUCTION
Drug and alcohol abuse' in America's labor force have attained
unprecedented levels.2 While absenteeism is perhaps the single
greatest cost faced by employers as a result of alcoholism and drug
addiction,3 intoxication in the work place produces another cost:
"It has been estimated that substance abusers file five times as many
1. The author recognizes that alcohol is, by definition, a drug. However, this Note uses
the terms "alcohol" and "drug" separately to clarify the fact that much of the law, both
statutory and common law, has focused upon alcohol intoxication and has not yet addressed
the problem of controlled substance intoxication in the workplace.
2. See W. SCANLON, ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE (1986).
The prevalence of substance abuse in the workplace is difficult to measure. However, esti-
mates of drug abuse alone indicate that as many as four million workers require treatment.
Id. at 1. In addition, it has been estimated that ten percent of the American work force are
alcoholics. Id. at 2. "Recent estimates indicate that 5 to 6 million Americans currently use
cocaine and that 23 million use marijuana. The sobering fact is that many of the individuals
who abuse alcohol and drugs go to work in our offices, factories and stores." Connors &
Engle, Alcohol and Drug Testing: Legal Considerations, 42 Mo. B.J. 523, 523-24 (1986) (foot-
note omitted) (citing Marcotte, Drugs at Work, 72 A.B.A.J. 34 (1986)). The prevalence of
substance abuse can be measured by its annual cost to business and industry. The National
Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism estimated a cost to society of over 25 billion
dollars in 1971. Archer, Occupational Alcoholism: A Review of Issues and a Guide to the
Literature, in ALCOHOLISM AND ITS TREATMENT IN INDUSTRY 1 (C. Schramm ed. 1977).
More current studies indicate significantly higher costs.
A consensus of the various sources published in the past few years suggests that the
cost of alcoholism and drug abuse to business and industry is in the neighborhood
of $20 billion and $16 billion, respectively. A more recent report by Peter B. Ben-
singer, former administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, however,
places the combined costs significantly higher. He reports that the cost of drug and
alcohol abuse is $65 billion per year in productivity losses, lives lost, futures for-
feited, and unnecessary accidents.
W. SCANLON, ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE 2 (1986).
3. Both total and partial absenteeism are blamed for major costs incurred by industry.
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workers' compensation claims as persons who are not so afflicted." 4
Ultimately, society bears the costs of employee intoxication.' One
of those costs is reflected in the ability of an employee to collect
compensation for job-related injuries caused by his intoxication at a
level deemed insufficient to remove him from the course of his em-
ployment. As a partial result of factors which operate against the
employer to decrease the likelihood of terminating the chronically
intoxicated employee,6 an increasingly dangerous and costly work
environment has emerged.
Ohio has recently responded both legislatively and judicially to
this situation. The judicial response, however, has been inappropri-
ate in that it has taken the form of judicial legislation. This Note
proposes that the judiciary's treatment of the non-statutory intoxi-
cation defense (abandonment)7 frustrates the principles underlying
See H. TRICE & P. ROMAN, SPIRITS AND DEMONS AT WORK: ALCOHOL AND OTHER
DRUGS ON THE JOB 2-3 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter SPIRITS AND DEMONS].
4. Geidt, Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Work Place: Balancing Employer and Em-
ployee Rights, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 181, 192 (1985) (citing Brecher, Ipsen, Wallace,
Burgower, Morris, Shirley, and Abrams, Taking Drugs on the Job, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22,
1983, at 52, 57); but see SPIRITS AND DEMONS, supra note 3, at 141-46 (studies have sug-
gested that due to increased caution exercised by intoxicated employees, the routine nature of
their jobs and absenteeism in cases of extreme intoxication, the deviant drinker is no more
accident prone than his non-drinking counterpart).
5. Whether the costs of on-the-job intoxication are reflected in the establishment of
rehabilitation programs for the alcoholic or drug-addicted employee, increased insurance
costs to the employer, or compensation claims for injury, the employer will be expected to
pass this increment to the consumer by adjusting the price of his product. These, however,
are not the only costs. See Berry & Boland, The Work-Related Costs of Alcohol Abuse, in
ALCOHOLISM AND ITS TREATMENT IN INDUSTRY 29-30 (C. Schramm ed. 1977) which
states:
In general, we tend to think of lost production in terms of goods and services that
usually flow through the traditional market system. But individuals also produce
goods and services in other roles as well .... Goods and services produced by and
within the household may not have market prices, but they are nonetheless valua-
ble. Thus, to the extent that alcohol abuse lowers productivity in nonmarket activi-
ties, society also suffers a real economic loss in the form of foregone goods and
services.
6. See Spencer, The Developing Notion of Employer Responsibility for the Alcoholic,
Drug-Addicted or Mentally Ill Employee: An Examination under Federal and State Employ-
ment Statutes and Arbitration Decisions, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 659, 662-63 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter Employer Responsibility] (although an employee may be performing inadequate work,
cover-ups may be made by a sympathetic co-worker or by an altruistic employer, thus
preventing termination); see also SPIRITS AND DEMONS, supra note 3, at 132-34. (Cover-ups
by alcoholics and drug users may differ. Generally, high status employees rely on self-cover-
ups while lower status employees rely more on associates, supervisors and subordinate
employees.)
7. The abandonment defense is based on the idea that by his intoxication, an employee
has left the scope of his employment and is therefore no longer entitled to workers' compen-
sation for his injuries See infra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
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workers' compensation and is incapable of effective implementation.
On August 25, 1986, the Ohio Supreme Court rendered an opin-
ion which clearly demonstrates the amorphous nature of the non-
statutory intoxication defense to workers' compensation claims. In
Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co.,' the court lowered the previously
established threshold of the abandonment doctrine and, in so doing,
has exposed the weakness of the doctrine. This Note will explore
intoxication as a bar to the recovery of workers' compensation and
it will emphasize the degree to which the non-statutory intoxication
defense, a no-fault basis for denying compensation, fails to
strengthen the no-fault system.
I. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
On August 22, 1986, the Ohio legislature followed the majority
of states by adopting a statutory intoxication defense to workers'
compensation claims. 9 Section 4123.54(B) of the Ohio Revised
Code now eliminates compensation where intoxication or the influ-
ence of a controlled substance is determined to be the proximate
cause of the injury.10 Denial of compensation for intoxication re-
8. 26 Ohio St. 3d 142, 497 N.E.2d 969 (1986).
9. Among the minority of states which do not provide a statutory defense are: Arizona,
Illinois, Missouri, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. Massachusetts and Michigan treat
intoxication as a form of willful misconduct capable of barring recovery. See infra note 38.
For state statutes providing a defense see: ALA. CODE § 25-5-51 (1986), ALASKA STAT.
§ 23,30,235 (1984), ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1305 (1976), COLO. REV. STAT. § 3600(a)(4)
(West Supp. 1987), COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-52-104 (1986), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-284
(West 1987), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2353)(b)(1985), D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-303 (1981),
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09 (3) (West 1981), IDAHO CODE § 72-208 (1973), IND. CODE ANN.
§ 22-3-2-8 (West 1978), IOWA CODE § 85.16 (1984), KAN. STAT, ANN. § 44-501 (1986), Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.610 (Baldwin, 1986), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1081(1)(b) (West
1985), ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 61 (1964), MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1985),
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.021 (West 1986), Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-7 (1982), NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-102 (1984), NEB. REV. STAT. § 616.565 (1981), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281:15
(1977), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 (West 1959), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-11 (1987), N.Y.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 10 (McKinney Supp. 1987), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12
(1985), N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-11 (1985), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.54 (Baldwin
Supp. 1986), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 11 (West Supp. 1987), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 41
(Purdon 1952), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-2 (1986), S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-60 (Law. Co-op.
1976), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-4-37 (1978), TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-110 (1983),
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 8306 (Vernon 1986), UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-14 (1953), VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 649 (1978), VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-38 (1987), W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2
(1973), Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.58 (West 1984), WYo. STAT. § 27-14-107(a)(xi)(1977).
10. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.54(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986). This statute now
provides that a worker whose injury or death is not:
(A) PURPOSELY self-inflicted; OR
(B) CAUSED BY THE EMPLOYEE BEING INTOXICATED OR UNDER
THE INFLUENCE OFA CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE NOT PRESCRIBED BY
A PHYSICIAN WHERE THE INTOXICATION OR BEING UNDER THE IN-
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lated injuries is frequently based on "proximate cause."' 1 Other
states employ statutory constructions of "sole" cause,'2 "primary"
cause,1 3 "direct" cause, 4 or injury "occasioned by intoxication"' 5
to bar compensation.' 6 Yet, all the statutes share a fault basis for
defining the compensable employee.
Despite the enactment of this new bill, the Ohio Supreme Court,
unable to apply the legislation retroactively, inappropriately en-
gaged in judicial legislation.' 7 Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co. 18 is
the substance of that legislation.
II. PHELPS V. POSITIVE ACTION TOOL Co.
Bill Phelps, an employee of Positive Action Tool Company
("PATCO") had been consuming alcohol for several hours at a lo-
cal bar when he was called into work.' 9 Before going to work,
Phelps stopped at another bar for a drink and then drove to an oil
drilling site "to talk with a prospective employee."2 After leaving
the drilling site and while enroute to his employer's plant, Phelps
lost control of the company truck2" and was injured in the resulting
FLUENCE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE NOT PRESCRIBED BY A
PHYSICIAN WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY, is entitled to
receive... compensation ....
Id. (emphasis added).
11. Larson, Intoxication as a Defense in Workmen's Compensation, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 398, 406 (1974) (Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, and New Jersey utilize the proximate
cause standard for determining liability).
12. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE § 45 (Supp. 1984);
N.Y. [WORK COMP.] LAW § 10 (Consol. 1984); OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 11 (West Supp. 1985);
See also Note, Workers' Compensation: Should Intoxication Bar Recovery?, 46 MONT. L.
REV. 419, 422 n. 24 (1985).
13. See FLA. STAT. ANN § 440.09(3) (West 1966); see also Larson, supra note 11, at 406
n.48.
14. Larson, supra note 11, at 406 n.49.
15. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 87-1305 (1960).
16. Larson, supra note 11, at 405-06; see also Note, supra note 12, at 422-24.
17. See Mominee v. Scherbarth, 28 Ohio St. 3d 270, 279 n.8, 503 N.E.2d 717, 724 n.8
(1986) (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring).
During this 1986 term of the Supreme Court of Ohio, members of the court have
repeatedly demonstrated their propensity for substituting their views of what the
state's laws should be for those of the General Assembly. This capricious rewriting
of Ohio's statutes and dilution of this state's constitutional guarantees has been ill-
advised and often dangerous. By way of example only, consider ... the wholesale
rewriting of workers' compensation laws exemplified by ... Phelps v. Positive Ac-
tion Tool Co .....
Id.
18. 26 Ohio St. 3d 142, 497 N.E.2d 969 (1986).
19. Id. at 142, 497 N.E.2d at 969.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 146, 497 N.E.2d at 973 (Contradictory evidence was offered at trial as to
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accident. A blood alcohol test 2 administered soon after the acci-
dent revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.21 percent.2 3
Although the Industrial Commission refused to compensate
Phelps for his injuries, 4 upon appeal to the Court of Common
Pleas of Wayne County, a jury determined "that the plaintiff was
within the scope of his employment and therefore entitled to work-
ers' compensation ...."'
The Ohio Supreme Court held on appeal that "Phelps' volun-
tary intoxication was tantamount to his abandonment of employ-
ment and that his injury was proximately caused by his gross state
of intoxication. 21 6 The court premised its holding on a finding that
Phelps "was incapable of performing the activity incidental to the
duties of his employment, that is, driving to the work site." 2
7
The judgment, however, was far from unanimous. Only Justices
Locher and Holmes concurred with the entire majority opinion. 8
In addition, there was an unpublished concurrence in judgment
only by Justice Douglas,29 a concurrence by Justice Sweeney in syl-
labus only,3" and two dissents: one by Justice Brown, 31 and one by
Chief Justice Celebrezze. 2
The dissent by Chief Justice Celebrezze was the most vigorous
of the two. Celebrezze criticized the majority for ignoring Ohio
precedent33 and for failing to recognize the limited applicability of
the abandonment defense as established by that precedent.34 The
whether the accident was caused by a tire blowout or whether Phelps fell asleep behind the
wheel of his vehicle).
22. See infra notes 88-90, 97-102 and accompanying text.
23. 26 Ohio St. 3d at 142, 497 N.E.2d at 970.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 147, 497 N.E.2d at 973.
26. Id. at 145, 497 N.E.2d at 972.
27. Id. at 145, 497 N.E.2d at 971.
28. Id. at 146, 497 N.E.2d at 972 (Holmes, J., concurring) (Justice Holmes also indi-
cated that OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.54, (Anderson Supp. 1986) which became effective
three days earlier, was a public policy pronouncement against payment of compensation for
injuries incurred during a departure from employment as allegedly occurred in Phelps).
29. Id. (Douglas, J., unpublished concurrence).
30. Id. (Sweeney, J., syllabus concurrence).
31. Id. at 157, 497 N.E.2d at 980 (Brown, J., dissenting) (Stating that "[t]he jury in the
instant cause determined that intoxication was not the proximate cause of the injury. Proxi-
mate cause is normally a question of fact for the jury.") (emphasis and citations omitted).
32. Id at 147, 497 N.E.2d at 973. (Celebrezze, CJ., dissenting).
33. Id. at 151, 497 N.E.2d at 976 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting) (the issue of severe intox-
ication barring compensation had previously been resolved in City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Karlin-
sky, 33 Ohio App. 42, 168 N.E. 475 (1929)). Prior Ohio decisions had allowed compensation
even where blood alcohol levels were high. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
34. Phelps, 26 Ohio St.3d at 150, 497 N.E.2d at 975. (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting)
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Chief Justice shared Justice Brown's distaste for the ease with
which the majority was able "to usurp the jury's sacrosanct role
",35
To understand how Phelps departs from the traditional applica-
tion of the intoxication defense, it is necessary to examine the his-
torical development of the doctrine.
III. INTOXICATION AS ABANDONMENT HISTORICALLY
The intoxication defense to workers' compensation claims has
its origin in England.3 6 The defense avoids the use of fault termi-
nology by barring recovery on the theory that the intoxicated em-
ployee has left the scope of his employment.3 7 Today, aside from
jurisdictions which deem intoxication to be a form of willful mis-
conduct,38 all but six states39 have enacted statutes which provide
the employer with a defense to workers' compensation claims where
intoxication has been a cause of injury.
The intoxication defense arose in England as a common law
doctrine in Frith v. Owners of S.S. Louisianian.' In that case, a
sailor who had reached "such a state of intoxication as to render
him unable to walk by himself"'' was helped to regain his ship and
"thrown to the deck like a sack of sand"'42 as the ship was leaving
("The difference between a worker who is so intoxicated [that he cannot stand] and a worker
who, though intoxicated, suffers a compensable injury during the course of his employment,
was enunciated in the post-Frith case of Williams v. Llandudno Coaching & Carriage Co.,
Ltd .. ") (citation omitted). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 156, 497 N.E.2d at 980. (Stating that "[q]uestions of fact concerning whether
an intoxicated worker's injuries arose in the course of employment are for determination by a
trier of fact and will not be disturbed by a reviewing court on appeal unless they are against
the manifest weight of the evidence.") (citation omitted). See supra note 31.
36. See Frith v. Owners of S.S. Louisianian, 2 K.B. 155 (1912).
37. See A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 34.21 (1985)
("[D]efense[s] have gone on the theory that, by reaching an advanced stage of intoxication,
the claimant has abandoned his employment, since he has made himself incapable of engag-
ing in the duties of that employment.").
38. Two states, Massachusetts and Michigan still bar compensation in cases of employee
intoxication under willful misconduct statutes. The states which reject the "willful miscon-
duct" defense recognize that although the consumption of alcohol may be purposeful, the
resulting intoxication may be completely unintended. There are isolated cases in other juris-
dictions in which the defense has been successfully asserted. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch.
152, § 27 (West 1979); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 418.305 (West 1967). But see Scraggins
v. Lorning Glass Co., 382 Mich. 628, 172 N.W.2d 367 (1969). See Larson, supra note 11, at
404-05.
39. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
40. 2 K.B. 155 (1912).
41. Id. at 158.
42. Id. at 160.
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port. As the unfortunate sailor attempted to stand, he "staggered
backwards and fell into the water"43 where he drowned. The
sailor's death was held not to have arisen from his employment, but
rather from his intoxication."
The first American case to rule that ordinary intoxication would
not defeat a workers' compensation claim was Nekoosa-Edwards
Paper Co. v. Industrial Commission.45 That case, decided in 1913,
established that intoxication was not necessarily a form of willful
misconduct, and that absent legislative action denying compensa-
tion, intoxication was not a defense.
46
Intoxication was not viewed as abandonment in this country
until 1918.' 7 In that year, Hahnemann Hospital v. Industrial
Board48 established that an intoxicated employee had not aban-
doned his employment when, ten minutes before he fell down a
stairway, the employee was able to issue a receipt for a load of
coal.4 9 The court cited Frith and observed that "intoxication which
does not incapacitate the employee from following his occupation is
not sufficient to defeat the recovery of compensation although the
intoxication may be a contributing cause of his injury."50 Although
the claimant was successful in recovering compensation, the court
suggested the possibility of non-recovery in cases involving extreme
intoxication."
Ohio first addressed the problem of intoxication in workers'
compensation claims in 1929.52 In City Ice & Fuel v. Karlinsky,53
an intoxicated wagon driver fell from his wagon when one of the
43. Id. at 156.
44. Id. at 160.
The whole question here is whether the accident to this man arose out of his em-
ployment. I have not the smallest hesitation in answering that in the negative. It
arose out of the fact that he was so hopelessly drunk that he could not stand, and I
doubt whether he could see.
Id.
45. 154 Wis. 105, 141 N.W. 1013 (1913).
46. Id. at 108, 141 N.W. at 1014 (Majority finding that "[w]hile intoxication in such
case to the degree specified might be a misdemeanor under the statute quoted, it is not neces-
sarily wilful misconduct within the compensation act.").
47. Hahnemann Hosp. v. Industrial Bd., 282 Ill. 316, 118 N.E. 767 (1918).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 325, 118 N.E. at 770 ("The two parties who hauled that coal and took his
receipts testified for the appellee that at the time he was intoxicated, but the evidence shows
that he was not so intoxicated as to be incapacitated from receipting for the coal.").
50. Id. at 327, 118 N.E. at 771.
51. Id.
52. City Ice & Fuel v. Karlinsky, 33 Ohio App. 42, 168 N.E. 475 (1929).
53. Id
1987]
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wheels entered a hole.54 Based on the finding of a half-empty whis-
key bottle in the employee's pocket,5 the employer insisted that the
empoyee's death was caused by his intoxication.56 The court, how-
ever, refused to find that "the employee, if intoxicated, was no
longer employed by the company, even though he was actually pur-
suing the work of the company for which he was employed."5"
Thus, the court held that intoxication would not prevent the em-
ployee's widow from recovering compensation.
The jurisdictional standards establishing the point at which in-
toxication reaches the level of abandonment vary. In Missouri for
example, the worker will be barred from recovering only when "in-
toxicat[ed] to the extent or degree that.., the employee could not
physically or mentally have been engaged in [his work]."58 Arizona
has determined that abandonment occurs at the point at which the
worker is "no longer capable of properly performing the duties of
his employment. ' 59 Similarly, Illinois has determined that when an
employee "can no longer follow his employment,"'  the point of
abandonment has been reached.
All jurisdictions have adhered, however, to the established tradi-
tion of denying compensation only for the most advanced stages of
intoxication, and only then when the employee is unable to further
the business of his employer.61 The Phelps decision is a clear depar-
ture from that tradition. As noted by Chief Justice Celebrezze's
dissent, despite a high level of intoxication, there was credible evi-
dence to suggest that the employee was actively engaged in further-
ing the business of PATCO.62 The distance the court was willing to
go to find that Phelps had abandoned his employment is an indica-
tion of the limited nature of the non-statutory intoxication defense.
54. Id. at 43, 168 N.E. at 475.
55. Id. at 45, 168 N.E. at 476.
56. Id. at 43, 168 N.E. at 476.
57. Id. at 45, 168 N.E. at 476.
58. O'Neil v. Fred Evans Motor Sales Co., 160 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Mo. App. 1942). A
travelling salesman who was injured in an auto accident shortly after rolling dice for drinks
was properly denied compensation by the Commission. The court commented that "if his
mind was a total blank on this occasion such condition was not brought about by reason of
his employment." Id. at 779.
59. Embree v. Industrial Comm'n, 21 Ariz. App. 411,412, 520 P.2d 324, 325-26 (1974).
60. Hahnemann Hosp. v. Industrial Bd. of Illinois, 282 Ill. 316, 327, 118 N.E. 767, 771
(1918). See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
61. The common denominator would therefore seem to be the ability of the employer to
benefit from the pre-injury conduct of the employee. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying
text.
62. Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co., 26 Ohio St. 3d 142, 155, 497 N.E.2d 969, 979
(1986) (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting).
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The decision brings the intoxication defense to a point which, ar-
guably, is equivalent to the denial of compensation based on fault
principles. 3 In so doing, Phelps frustrates the no-fault principle
upon which workers' compensation is based.'
IV. FAULT IN A NO-FAULT SYSTEM
Although much of the language appearing in state workers'
compensation acts has been adopted from the English workmen's
compensation statutes6" introduced by Chamberlain in 1897,66 the
no-fault origin of workers' insurance is generally attributed to Ger-
many.67 The revolutionary adoption of no-fault compensation for
workmen in the United States began in New York in 1910.68 The
wave of legislation which swept this country in the first two decades
of the twentieth century was prompted by emerging sympathies for
the industrial worker:
[T]he advanced collectivist . . . believes that society as a
whole should share the shock of industrial accidents rather than
that it should be borne by the particular individual whose ill for-
tune it is to suffer it immediately, and so desires to place the
burden primarily on the employer, who, in theory at least, can
add the cost to the price of his product and so distribute the
loss. 6
9
Amidst this revolution a funeral pyre burned for the "unholy
trinity":'0 assumption of risk, the fellow servant doctrine, and con-
63. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
64. See infra note 81.
65. Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance: A Review of
Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 57, 68 (phrases such as "arising out of" and
"in the course of" are notable examples).
66. The first employers' liability act, which was passed by Parliament in 1880, generally
proved inadequate in addressing the realities of the industrial accident. This was due largely
to the employer's defense of assumption of risk. J. BOYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES TO WORKMEN UNDER MODERN INDUSTRIAL STATUTES
§ 18 (1913).
67. Id. at § 20.
68. Rhodes, The Inception of Workmen's Compensation in the United States, 11 ME. L.
REv. 35, 52 (1917). (The difficulties which states experienced in enacting this sweeping sys-
tem is noted by the fact that while the Massachusetts legislature began to examine the subject
as early as 1898, that state did not enact its workman's compensation provision until 1908.
Commissions for study were also formed in Illinois and Wisconsin prior to the 1910 adoption
in New York. Once adopted, the acts were subjected to constitutional challenges. The origi-
nal New York law was held unconstitutional the following year. Id.
69. Bohlen, .4 Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L.
REV. 328, 330 (1912).
70. See PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS § 80 (5th ed. 1985).
1987]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tributory negligence.71 The demise of the employer's defense of
contributory negligence is the mainstay of workers' compensation.
By eliminating an inquiry into fault, foregone litigation expenses
may be passed on to the deserving employee in the form of
compensation.72
The traditional construction of the intoxication defense of aban-
donment avoids inquiry into fault.73 By defining abandonment as
applying only to those employees incapable of performing any acts
beneficial to the employer, the economic integrity of the system is
maintained. But what becomes of the system when inquiry must be
made into the cause of the employee's injury?
In his dissent in Phelps, Chief Justice Celebrezze unabashedly
condemned what he viewed as a resurrection of contributory negli-
gence. 74 The import of this warning must not be subrogated to in-
stincts which preach that a worker who "contributes" to his own
injury by increasing the risk of its incidence through intoxication
deserves to reap what he has sown. Once the court has determined
that abandonment may occur while the employee is still engaged in
an activity which benefits the employer, the foundation for barring
recovery becomes one of fault. 75 As such, in situations where more
than one cause of injury is suggested, contributory negligence be-
comes operative.
Despite the conviction that intoxication has no place in the em-
ployment environment, the defense of contributory negligence, even
if allowed, would not aid the intoxication dilemma for two reasons.
First, the deterrent effect of contributory negligence is of dubious
value. "[T]he defense of contributory negligence offers amnesty to a
careless defendant every time it administers a deterrent lash to a
careless plaintiff, so that its effect as a deterrent is exactly offset by
71. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
72. There may, however, be other costs associated with the system. See Kasper, The
Faults of No-Fault: The Case of Workers' Compensation, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 92, 94 (1978).
[W]hile workers' compensation does not require a determination of fault, it does
necessitate the determination of a number of other frequently contested issues, such
as whether the injury "arose out of" the worker's employment or whether the dam-
ages were the result of the preexisting condition of the worker. Thus, contested
jurisdictional and causation issues must still be decided and are likely to effect some
of the cost savings expected from a no-fault system.
Id.
73. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
74. Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co., 26 Ohio St. 3d 142, 153-54, 497 N.E.2d 969, 978
(1986)(Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting).
75. It is at this point, too, where the total cost of production will fail to be represented in
the price of the product.
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its invitation to be careless without penalty. ' 76 The ever-present
threat is that intoxication could be made the scape-goat for the em-
ployer's negligence. Further, the deterrent effect of a rule of con-
tributory negligence upon an individual who is already in violation
of employment rules against intoxication is also questionable.77
Rather, in a "firm" setting where no-fault liability exists, "contribu-
tory negligence puts its pressure on the wrong place and relieves the
pressure where it will do the most good. It is a net incentive to
carelessness, not to safety."'78
Secondly, the litigation spawned by the introduction of causa-
tion issues is prohibitive and threatens the workers' compensation
fund itself. At the inception of workers' compensation, "the elimi-
nation of fault related issues was a means of obviating costly and
sometimes spurious litigation, as well as saving court resources and
attorneys' fees."79 The extended reach given the abandonment doc-
trine by Phelps would jeopardize this benefit. It is recognized that
"[l]itigation cannot be avoided entirely. Some facts must always be
proved, and evidence of them may conflict."8" However, by limit-
ing the availability of the abandonment defense to those cases where
the employee is clearly incapable of benefitting his employer in
some way, the number of cases litigated could be reduced.
Indeed, it is at the point of cessation of net benefit to the em-
76. James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 701 (1953) (citing Lowndes,
Contributory Negligence, 22 GEo. LJ. 674, 681-83 (1934)).
77. See Marmo, Arbitrators View Alcoholic Employees: Discipline or Rehabilitation?, 37
ARB. J. 17, 18 (1982):
Few contracts or company rules address the problem of alcohol abuse at any length.
In almost half the instances examined, employees were disciplined for unacceptable
use of alcohol even though no formal standard of acceptable behavior had ever been
established. Frequently, the disciplinary action taken by management was based on
its contractual right to discipline employees for just cause.
78. James, supra note 76, at 702; see also NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS, THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (1972) [hereinafter THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION].
Because the employer's control over working conditions far exceeds that of the em-
ployee, we believe that assigning to the employer the largest portion of the costs of
work-related injuries and diseases will best serve the objective of safety. It might be
argued that the appropriate way to assess the cost of work-related impairments is on
a case-by-case basis, with the burden assigned in proportion to each party's negli-
gence. This scheme, however, would be inherently litigious and would clearly vio-
late the objective of an effective delivery system.
Id. at 39.
79. Ashford & Johnson, Negligence vs. No-Fault Liability An Analysis of the Workers'
Compensation Example, 12 SETON HALL 725, 731-32 (1982).
80. Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance: A Review of
Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 57, 72; see supra note 72.
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ployer that abandonment takes on meaning in terms of the stated
policy objectives of workers' compensation.81 Where the cost of the
additional risk produced by the intoxicated employee outweighs the
benefit of the duties performed for the employer, the intoxication
has ceased to be a "reasonable" cost of production.82 This, then, is
the most logical threshhold for the intoxication defense. Since one
of the goals of workers' compensation is to reflect all true costs of
production in the price of the product,8 3 and since elevated risk
which exceeds all possible benefit cannot properly be called a cost of
production, intoxication which creates such a negative value to the
employer must fall outside the realm of workers' compensation.
The Frith holding espoused this concept. The benefit available
to the employer had been reduced to zero when the employee be-
came "totally incapacitated from discharging any of the duties at-
tached to his office, and he did not attempt to perform them." 4
Similarly, the risk of injury to the sailor, which was high when tak-
ing into consideration the nature of his work, needed only to exceed
the possible benefit to his employer to produce an unreasonable cost
of production.
8 1. The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws cited five major
objectives for an effective program. "The... objectives are: [b]road coverage of employees
and work-related injuries and diseases . . . [s]ubstantial protection against interruption of
income . . . [p]rovision of sufficient medical care and rehabilitation services . . .
[e]ncouragement of safety ... [a]n effective system for delivery of the benefits and services."
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 78, at 15.
Most radical of all these objectives was the establishment of a legal principle
alien to the common law: liability without fault. The costs of work-related injuries
were to be allocated to the employer, not because of any presumption that he was to
blame for every individual tragedy, but because of the inherent hazards of industrial
employment. Compensation for work-related accidents was therefore accepted as a
cost of production.
Id. at 34.
82. In order to determine the point at which reasonable costs of production cease, how-
ever, it is imperative not to beg the question. At the point of injury, hindsight allows the
conclusion that benefit to the employer has been exceeded by the liability the employer faces.
Rather, assessment of net benefit must be made in light of the risk at the point immediately
prior to the injury. See infra text accompanying note 83.
83. See Oi, Workmen's Compensation & Industrial Safety, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES
FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 41 (1973).
[T]he economic theory of joint production is reviewed for three reasons. First, no
one intentionally "produces" industrial accidents. Work injuries are accepted as
undesirable "bad" by-products in order to obtain larger outputs of [production]
.... Second, an externality can conveniently be regarded as a by-product for which
there is no market. Third, it shows how the technical trade-offs between injuries
and goods can be influenced by both the employer and employee. A real cost of
greater industrial safety is the value of the resources that are devoted to accident
prevention and that otherwise could have been used to produce more.
Id. at 42.
84. Frith v. Owners of S.S. Louisianian, 2 K.B. 155, 158 (1912) (emphasis in original).
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An individual may be able to operate adequately while in a state
of intoxication,8" thereby providing a sufficently high benefit to his
employer. In this way the increasing risk of accident produced by
his intoxication may reflect a true cost of production. 6 In Phelps,
there was good reason to find that such a level of benefit had been
received by the employer.87 The limitations of the non-statutory
defense are therefore clear. Only in a situation where the employee
is not performing the duties of his employment, such as when he
has passed out due to his intoxication, may the absence of benefit to
the employer be assessed with any accuracy. In short, although the
abandonment defense successfully avoids the introduction of fault
into workers' compensation, it may tolerate a more dangerous work
environment. That fact alone, however, should not permit the judi-
ciary to introduce fault into a no-fault system.
V. INTOXICATION: LEVELS AND TYPES
A. Blood Alcohol Level
A meaningful analysis of intoxication in the work place requires
an understanding of its two components: level of intoxication and
type of intoxication. To some extent, the distinction is currently
unimportant as only alcohol-induced intoxication is capable of be-
ing measured with any relative accuracy. Nevertheless, as technol-
ogy improves it is likely that methods will be developed for
measuring the level of drug-induced intoxication.
The majority in Phelps did not indicate an objective level at
which a court should find that an injury arose from intoxication
rather than from employment. While Phelps had a blood alcohol
level of 0.21 percent,88 former Ohio precedent had indicated that
85. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
86. In Iowa, for example, the legislature felt there was a strong need for volunteer fire
fighters. The legislature passed a bill which would have allowed compensation for volunteer
fire fighters who had blood alcohol levels of up to 0.15%, a level 0.02% higher than that
allowed by state drunk driving laws. See UPI Proprietary, Thurs. A.M., April 25, 1985
(NEXIS) (bill vetoed by Governor).
87. In his dissent, Celebrezze noted several factors from which the employer derived
benefit:
The instant record is replete with evidence which sustains the verdict. For example,
there was credible evidence before the jury that, among other things appellee was
driving a company truck; he had received a telephone call from a PATCO worker
regarding a plant production problem; such calls were routine because of the nature
of Phelps' supervisory position; he was enroute to the plant; he had, immediately
preceding the accident, been on a recruiting visit at a drilling site.
Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co., 26 Ohio St.3d 142, 155, 497 N.E.2d 969, 979 (1986)(Cele-
brezze, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 142, 497 N.E.2d at 970.
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such a level would not remove an employee from the course of em-
ployment.89 Therefore, the majority's treatment of the jury finding
below may indicate the Ohio Supreme Court's willingness to over-
turn awards for compensation in situations where the level of intox-
ication exceeds 0.21 percent.
If such a willingness actually exists, however, it has not pre-
vented the Ohio Court of Appeals in Chester Scafford, Inc. v. Han-
1ey 90 from awarding compensation where decedent's blood alcohol
level was stipulated to have been 0.27 percent.91 In that case, the
worker had consumed five to six beers during his lunch break before
resuming work on the Perry Memorial at Put-in-Bay.92 After
lunch, the worker ascended the scaffolding at the monument "to a
height exceeding two hundred feet,"9 3 before falling to his death.
The Ottawa Court of Common Pleas, which was unable to rely on
section 4123.54(B) of the Ohio Revised Code, 94 granted summary
judgement for the decedent's widow.95 The employer appealed,
basing his argument on Phelps.
The Ohio Court of Appeals, relying on the stipulated facts and
the Phelps decision, determined that the blood alcohol level alone
could not remove the employee from his employment:
Appellant proffers the blood-alcohol content of the decedent as
proof sufficient to meet its substantial burden of proof. This evi-
dence fails to sufficiently establish that decedent was incapaci-
tated from following his occupation. Indeed, the evidence that
decedent ascended two hundred feet of scaffolding in accordance
with his employment vitiates any presumption of abandonment
inferred from a measurement of decedent's blood-alcohol
content.96
In states where intoxication is a statutory defense, compensation
has been awarded in the presence of a wide range of blood alcohol
89. Higgins v. Daugherty, No. 81AP-405, slip op. at 6-7 (Ohio App. Mar. 30, 1982) (an
employee with a blood alcohol level of .21 percent was determined to be in the course of her
employment despite operating a motor vehicle for her employer in an impaired condition).
90. No. 23160, slip op. J7-91 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1987).
91. Appellee's Brief and Reply at 1, Chester Scaffolding, Inc. v. Hanley, No. 23160, slip
op. J7-91 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1987).
92. Chester Scaffolding, Inc. v. Hanley, No 23160, slip. op. J7-91 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
4, 1987).
93. Id.
94. Appellee's Brief and Reply at 3, Chester Scaffolding, Inc. v. Hanley, No. 23160, slip.
op. J7-91 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1987).
95. Chester Scaffolding, Inc. v. Hanley, No. 23160, slip. op. J7-91 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
4, 1987).
96. Id. at J7-93-94.
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levels.9 7 This range reflects a belief that a worker's injury is not
always related to his level of intoxication. Similarly, in states which
do not have a statutory intoxication defense, high levels of blood
alcohol have not prevented awards.9" Ohio, too, has refused99 to
"decide precisely at what point and under what circumstances an
employee, through severe intoxication, can remove himself from the
scope of his employment."' "°° Failure to deny compensation solely
on the basis of intoxication level suggests that blood alcohol level
alone is not determinative of the benefit received by the employer
from the worker's performance.101 Indeed, some employers fully
contemplate the likelihood of employee intoxication in the course of
conducting business. Where, for example, an employee has public
relations duties which tend to expose him to intoxication, the em-
ployer nevertheless expects net benefit from the dealings of his em-
ployee." 2 In such instances, reasonable costs of production may
allow for higher levels of intoxication. The use of a standard level
to bar compensation would, therefore, not promote true cost
allocation.
The difficulty with all intoxication defenses, whether statutory
or not, is that they embrace several types of workers: both the
97. See A. LARSON, supra note 37, § 34.13 (1985). Awards of compensation are not
uncommon in situtations where the employee's blood alcohol level exceeds 0.30%. In New
York, for example, eight such awards have been granted - the highest blood alcohol level
being 0.35%. The Minnesota Courts have awarded compensation where intoxication ex-
ceeded 0.30% while denying it at an intoxication level of 0.2858%. Similar discrepencies
exist in many other states.
98. Oregon has awarded compensation where blood alcohol levels reached 0.37% and
0.40%. See Boyd v. Francis Ford Inc., 12 Or. App. 26, 504 P.2d 1387 (1973) (employee
killed in one car accident after drinking with "prospective purchasers"); Beneficiaries of Mc-
Broom v. Chamber of Commerce, 77 Or. App. 700, 713 P.2d 1095 (1986) (employee found
dead in hotel jacuzzi where he was attending a weekend conference).
99. Ohio has deemed that the actual point of abandonment is dependent on no one
single factor. See Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co., 26 Ohio St. 3d 142, 144-45, 497 N.E.2d
969, 970-71 (intoxication alone does not necessarily constitute a departure from employ-
ment); Chester Scaffolding, Inc., at J7-93 (abandonment jury question).
100. American Safety Razor Co. v. Hunter, 2 Va. App. 258, 259, 343 S.E.2d 461, 463
(1986) (The employee was injured from a fall when the forklift on which he was standing
unexpectedly lurched backwards. Rather than argue that intoxication was the cause of the
fall, the employer contended that by reporting to work with a blood alcohol level of approxi-
mately .307 percent, the employee had removed himself from the scope of employment. The
court, however, dismissed the employer's defense because the employee had been actively
performing his duties at the time of injury).
101. Aside from issues of benefit to the employer, the blood alcohol test itself is only
admissible as evidence of intoxication under specific conditions. See infra notes 109 & 110.
102. See West Florida Distrib. v. Laramie, 438 So.2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(employer's policy of encouraging salesmen to drink with customers estopped employer from
asserting the intoxication defense).
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chronically intoxicated employee, and the employee whose intoxica-
tion at work is highly unusual but which unfortunately coincides
with his injury. Instinctively there is more compassion for the latter
employee-perhaps out of identification with occasional bad judg-
ment. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which a model
employee, having celebrated a special occasion on his lunch hour,
becomes minimally intoxicated and sustains an injury upon re-
turning to work. In such an instance, a system which denies com-
pensation only to employees with severe levels of intoxication would
seem to eliminate the harsh sanction on the first-time-intoxicated
employee. Such a consideration, however, cannot be the basis for
choosing the abandonment doctrine over a statutory proximate
cause defense. First, the intoxication-causing behavior is no less vo-
litional for the worker above than it is for the alcoholic. Second,
and more importantly, the blood alcohol differences between the
first-time-intoxicated employee and the heavy drinker are not neces-
sarily indicative of ability to perform while intoxicated. "[The] ha-
bitually heavy drinker develops a tissue tolerance for alcohol which
may require doses' three to four times greater than a moderate
drinker would have to drink to produce characteristic behavioral
effects." 103 In the same manner, the moderate drinker may suffer
greater physiological effects from significantly reduced amounts of
alcohol."° Both create unreasonable risks to themselves and their
fellow employees. A distinction between these two groups of em-
ployees is therefore unfounded.
B. Drug Intoxication
Although the majority of this discussion has concentrated on
alcohol-induced intoxication, with the increased use of drugs in the
work place,° 5 intoxication defenses in the future may present spe-
cial problems to the employer. Surprisingly, very little action has
been taken by state legislatures to explicitly bar compensation for
injuries which occur while under the influence of a controlled sub-
stance. In that respect, Ohio's legislation is progressive.1 0 6 At least
one court has ruled that in barring compensation, intoxication need
103. A. KOVEN & S. SMITH, ALCOHOL-RELATED MISCONDucT 79 (1984).
104. Id. at 79 n.64 (several physicians have indicated that actual intoxication may occur
at minimal levels and that non-drinkers are especially vulnerable).
105. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(7)
(1985) (where a compensable injury is defined to exclude an "injury received because of the
use of narcotics or intoxicants while in the course of employment").
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not be alcohol-specific." 7 For the most part however, the issue has
not yet been addressed. "[I]t seems inevitable that this issue will
have to be squarely confronted sooner or later, and when it is, the
parties will have to turn to the only two available sources of author-
ity: dictionaries, and non-compensation cases."108
Drug intoxication presents an added difficulty for the employer
in terms of proof. While evidentiary findings of blood alcohol con-
tent must conform to standards which ensure accuracy,"0 9 the stan-
dards for drugs have yet to be determined. Despite advances in
technology which assure greater degrees of accuracy in drug testing
programs, 1 the results of these tests are determinative of drug use
rather than intoxication. '11 If, for example, Phelps had been given
a urinalysis subsequent to his accident which tested positive for co-
caine, the test results would not indicate Phelps' degree of intoxica-
tion at the time of the accident. In the same manner, testimony of a
witness to the effect that Phelps was seen smoking marijuana1 2 or
107. Texas General Indem. Co. v. Jackson, 683 S.W.2d 879, 881 (rex. Ct. App. 1984).
The court drew upon the state's provision for involuntary manslaughter and concluded that
in a workers' compensation case, "intoxication could result from the 'voluntary introduction
of any substance into his body.'" (citation omitted).
108. A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 34.39 (1985).
109. Id. at § 34.12.
[T]he blood must be positively identified as that of the deceased. The time inter-
val between the injury and the administration of the test must not be too great. The
sample of blood must be adequate, and the equipment must be correct and must not
have been recently cleaned with alcohol. And a qualified person must testify as to
the circumstances surrounding the taking of the sample.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See, eg., Erickson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 123
N.W.2d 292 (N.D.1963) (an unsealed blood sample was inadmissible as evidence where the
sample had been accessible to others). See also United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d
760 (rex. Ct. App. 1986) (gaps in chain of possession of blood sample impeached its
trustworthiness).
110. Higher degrees of accuracy in drug testing may be obtained when more expensive
follow-up tests are performed after routine urinalysis tests. See Rust, Drug Testing: The
Legal Dilemma, A.B.AJ., Nov. 1, 1986, at 50.
CompuChem uses gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS) exclusively
for follow-up testing. GCMS reduces the constituent chemicals to their molecular
level and identifies "fingerprint" of a specific drug. According to Bensinger, while
GCMS tests have not yet been able to identify steroid use in athletes, they are "100
times 99.9 percent accurate" in confirming the presence of the nine most commonly
abused drugs - amphetamines, barbituates, benzodiazepines .... cocaine, mari-
juana, opiates, PCP, methaqualone and methadone.
Id at 52.
Ill. See Drug Testing in the Workplace.: A Clash of Rights, Legal Times, Aug. 4, 1986, at
27, col. 2. "Opponents of testing have argued that results of urine tests have no relationship
to on-the-job performance because they do not indicate present impairment. Urine testing
detects the presence of metabolites of drugs in the body but does not directly measure impair-
ment." Id at 28, col. 4.
112. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Silas, 635 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1982) (despite facts
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taking pills... prior to his accident would not be determinative of
intoxication. Drug intoxication is, therefore, much more of a po-
tential problem for the employer-even under Ohio's new provi-
sion. One may assume, however, that as familiarity with narcotic
intoxication increases, precise methods of measuring the levels of
drug intoxication will also arise.
CONCLUSION
Increased drug and alcohol abuse will continue to be a major
cost for business and industry. One of those costs will be in the
form of compensation paid to workers who were injured while in-
toxicated on the job. The non-statutory intoxication defense of
abandonment has been an attractive doctrine because it avoids the
determination of fault. Unfortunately, it has also allowed employ-
ees to collect for injuries caused solely by their intoxication. But to
the extent that the employer was receiving a benefit from the activi-
ties of the employee prior to the injury, there is a strong argument
that the injury should be borne as a cost of production.
The historical application of the abandonment defense has as-
sured that only where the employer was not benefitting from the
activities of the employee would compensation be denied. This was
accomplished by finding abandonment only in the most advanced
stages of intoxication; cases where the employee was completely in-
capacitated. The Phelps decision, however, lowers the threshhold of
the abandonment doctrine.
In light of Ohio's new statutory intoxication defense, the impli-
cations of the Phelps decision are limited in Ohio. Nevertheless, the
decision serves as a warning to other jurisdictions which still rely on
the abandonment defense. The judiciary should not be tempted to
do what the legislators have failed to do. Any alteration of existing
workers' compensation acts must be initiated by state legislatures.
Those states which continue to rely on the antiquated doctrine of
abandonment risk the improper introduction of fault into a no-fault
system.
JAMES H. GROVE
that employee was seen smoking a hand rolled cigarette and that marijuana was later found
in his lunch box, the absence of evidence of intoxication kept the issue from the jury).
113. See Texas General Indem. Co. v. Jackson, 683 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(testimony that employee was seen taking pills and later exhibited "'light" behavior was not
evidence of intoxication).
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